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Abstract
The aim of our research was to compare the methods of privatization of social 
ownership and monetary system in the countries of former Yugoslavia with the 
privatization mode and monetary arrangement that could be considered as 
optimal. By applying the method of comparative analysis, it has been found out 
that the way of socially-owned enterprises being privatized and monetary 
regulations implemented had the crucial impact on the transition in the countries 
of former Yugoslavia. In fact, the chosen methods of privatization and monetary 
arrangements applied in these countries have established economies of 
uncompetitive enterprises. Privatization was either macro-economically harmful 
for the domestic savings and capital formation and / or unjust for people. In 
addition, our analyses have proved that the monetary regulation and foreign 
exchange policy were either not implemented at all or too little to neutralize the 
negative consequences of selling companies to foreign investors on the foreign 
exchange rate. The same goes for the combination of monetary policy and foreign 
exchange rate policy that should have been implemented so as to prevent 
speculative import and export of short-term capital. For the countries that have 
not joined the EU yet, it might be helpful to comply with the conclusions of our 
research and  examine their path toward a market economy.
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1. Introduction
In the countries that were created on the territory of former Yugoslavia at the 
beginning of the 1990s the transition meant primarily that previous social ownership 
of non-financial enterprises had to be abolished and that new monetary 
arrangements should be introduced. The latter would not have been necessary if 
these were not newly formed states. By contrast to other countries in which 
transition commenced in the same period, Yugoslavia did not have a mono-banking 
or monetary system. Nevertheless, the method of the privatization, i. e. abolishment 
of the social ownership, together with the chosen monetary arrangement has 
determined the path of these countries toward  market economy. This is why we 
connect these two issues and in the first two chapters discuss abolishment of social 
ownership (“privatization”) and monetary systems or arrangements.
In our paper we discuss the problems of generally limited monetary sovereignty in 
small countries in detail, which is due to the fact that, that in such small countries, 
there is space for only one of two economic policies we are interested in. One can 
choose only specific combinations of monetary and exchange rate policy. Our main 
hypothesis is that monetary policy and exchange rate policy were not used enough 
to neutralize the negative effects on the exchange rate which originated from the 
sale of enterprises to foreign investors. In our analysis we rely on relevant literature, 
historical facts, IMF data and data available from national central banks. 
The monetary arrangement chosen, primarly determined by the exchange rate regime, 
determines the connections of the national economy with the rest of the world. Since 
this connection is of great significance, we discuss this issue in the fourth chapter. At 
first we discuss the (monetary) consequences of the sale of enterprises to foreign 
investors, which has usually been put forward as the model method of establishing 
private ownership of firms. Then we talk about the so-called sterilization interventions 
of central banks on the foreign exchange market. These were economically necessary 
if new ownership of enterprises meant that firms had been sold to foreign investors. In 
many cases this was economically justified. 
In small economies and monetary areas there is even less possibility to talk about 
monetary sovereignty then in bigger states (Mundell, 2010). If there is a free 
movement of capital or money cross-border, which sooner or later happened in all 
of the countries that are dealt with in this paper, and not necessarily because of 
ideological or foreign-policy reasons, as in the case in the so-called Washington 
consensus (Berr, 2005), but rather because of the practical impossibility to create an 
effective control over cross-border flow of money, and there is very little possibility 
of pursuing an independent monetary or exchange rate policy. There is typically 
room for only one policy to conduct freely and independently. But when we say 
there is little possibility, we wish to stress that the countries can choose the specific 
combination of monetary and exchange rate policy. In this way, countries can 
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choose a combination of policies that prevents possible negative effects of a full 
openness. Such negative effects could be in the speculative inflow of money in or 
out of the country, for instance. We discuss this in the fifth chapter. At the end there 
are conclusions.
2. Privatization or the abolishment of social ownership  
of non-financial enterprises
Although in matters of less importance, legal principles were strictly followed, as if 
Yugoslavia had been a country where the rule of law was obeyed, they were 
completely disregarded with respect of the most significant issue – ownership of 
enterprises. And it is surprising, since in Yugoslavia in the case of ownership of 
enterprises a high degree of consistency and logic was followed – a particular logic, 
of course. To merely talk about abolishment of social ownership privatization only of 
non-financial enterprises could be perceived as strange by many. The prevailing 
opinion was, and still is, that everything was once owned by the state and therefore 
everything must be privatized. The cause of this was not probably only because of 
indolence, or the desire for oversimplification, or to resemble other states in Eastern 
Europe. For instance, that there were other motives behind such opinions are visible 
from the way the social ownership was abolished, i. e. who benefited the most.
In our case there was no state-ownership of enterprises so there was no need of 
privatization, which is one of the most widely used words during transition. It was 
something with which the transition could or should begin. But, for instance, banks 
had their owners, the so called founders; financial insurance undertakings were 
mutual, while non-financial enterprises were in social ownership. Thus, banks could 
not be privatized, except when they came under state ownership because of their 
rehabilitation. Insurance undertakings could not be privatized, either, but only 
transformed into stock companies through a well-known process 
(“demutualisation”). Again, it was not privatization2. What inevitably had to be 
done was to transform non-financial enterprises in social ownership into privately 
or state-owned enterprises. Only in the case when during the abolishment of social 
ownership, business enterprises became state-owned, privatization was to be 
considered. Not immediately but in majority of cases sometimes in the future 
(Ribnikar, 1998). 
If we leave aside non-financial enterprises that turned into stately- owned ones, there 
was a dilemma for most enterprises in social ownership whether to distribute the 
2 Mutual or cooperative financial institutions, although still present in old market economies, were 
regarded in our countries as communist heritage. Hence, today there are almost extinct. 
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shares among citizens in a fair manner (for instance, to each one equal part) or to 
sell those shares to private investors at the highest possible price. This would be 
apparently a fair solution as well. Although someone could ask to whom the price 
should be paid when something socially owned was being sold, no such questions 
had ever been raised. As it was reiterated many times, everything was at least de 
facto state-owned so it was logical that all the proceeds from sale should go to the 
state. But another question that has never been raised is even more significant; and 
that is how those private investors could afford to buy such valuable properties.
The so-called dilemma about the two ways of abolishing social ownership, both of 
which were considered to be fair was not a dilemma about two different ways, but 
rather a dilemma whether to follow a more unfair or more damaging way from the 
point of view of domestic capital and saving formation. Naimely, both ways, come 
down to the same result (Ribnikar, 1997).
Before we get to the results, however, we should discuss something that no one has 
taken into account yet. Namely, although in our case there was originally no place 
for the privatization as there was no state-ownership, nevertheless there had been 
important cases of privatization (such as in France or England at the beginning of 
the 1980s) that could be perceived as significant for us as well. This was the 
experience regarding the way in which the private sectors could buy enterprises that 
were not sold to them by private owners3. In fact if the sale and/or purchases are 
between private investors, this is something that is happening almost always and 
there are no big problems. But if the seller is not the private owner, and it is as well 
the case of France, England as of Slovenia and other countries of the region 
abolishing social ownership, then there are the same problems. The problems are 
how the private sector will be able to buy these enterprises. Our countries were in 
an even more difficult position, as the volumes of these sales or purchases were 
much larger. 
The experience we have ignored is that private investors cannot buy enterprises 
which are not sold by other private investors, if the entity acting as the seller does 
not enable private investors to act as buyers. In the case of France (Durupty, 1988) 
and Great Britain, it was the state that was selling businesses and at the same time 
enabling the private sectors to buy enterprises offered to them. This was made 
possible in such a away that when the state offered shares of enterprises to private 
investors, at the same time it also bought back its bonds from them. In that way 
those investors gained the means necessary to buy these enterprises. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, these transactions resemble a swap contract. As a 
3 If the private owners are those who sell, there is only a change in the form of their assets. This is 
because with the money they receive from their sale they buy some other assets. If it is the state that 
sells, then the state cannot buy something for that money. In that case state ownership would not be 
decreased at all. 
Ivan Ribnikar, Marko Košak • Transition, privatization and monetary arrangements... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2011 • vol. 29 • sv. 2 • 333-353 337
result the structure of assets held by the private sector changed – instead of 
government bonds there were now shares of privatized companies. From the 
perspective of the state, the shares in its ownership decreases and at the same time 
its debt decreases by the same amount. 
In this way those states, non-transition and democratic, have made sure that during 
privatization there was no space for unfair behaviour (no one became reach because 
of the fact that the seller was not a private investor) and that there was no space for 
negative effects on domestic capital or saving formation. So wealthy states were not 
so reach to allow this to happen.
The poorer transition countries were able to ignore this experience because they 
were non-democratic. This is the reason why no one raised the question of fairness. 
Moreover, an example of a widely accepted lie was the supposed truth that 
privatization could never be fair. As for the negative effects on capital and saving 
formation, they were disregarded4. 
All of this could have been avoided5, but let us leave it all aside as it has not been 
relevant for a long time now. In order to find connection with monetary 
arrangements in the next chapter we have to say a few words about the possible exit 
from the impasse that privatization is unfair and damaging. It is an exit that was 
found or that came forward somehow automatically and which can be expressed 
very simply: business enterprises must be sold to foreigners. This solution was 
acceptable since foreign consultants wholeheartedly suggested it6. In fact this was 
something that reaffirmed a country’s openness. And since the monetary 
arrangement and the exchange rate regime determine a country’s connections with 
the world – and with it its openness, we have in this way already made introduction 
to our next chapter. 
3. The monetary arrangement and the exchange rate regime
Small economies or small monetary areas have limitations and peculiarities 
irrespective of the fact whether they are transition economies or not, and whether 
they are newly founded states or not. For these countries the exchange rate and 
4 In many cases they could not think about it at all. Proceeds from privatization were necessary as a 
mean to survive – to pay wages to employed in public administration and to pay pensions. 
5 Such is, for instance, the proposal to transfer the ownership of enterprises to pension funds. Why to 
do this, and how to do it, was the subject of several papers (Ribnikar, 1993; Ribnikar, 1994.). 
6 No foreign consultant saw a macroeconomic problem if the enterprises are sold to foreigners, 
although the experience of France and Great Britain that we have mentioned should have been 
known to them. They also did not deem problematic the fact that in this way these countries will get 
used to large deficits in the current account. 
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external liquidity are of vital significance. They cannot implement an exchange rate 
regime that does not guarantee relative stability of the exchange rate. So the “pure” 
or “free floating” regimes are not an option for these countries. This is why in these 
countries the central bank has to hold relatively large amounts of foreign exchange 
or international monetary reserves. 















Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics and central banks
The exchange rate regime determines to great extent the monetary arrangement or 
monetary system. In fact the majority of the monetary aggregate that we call “base 
money” changes, in small countries, through central bank transactions on the foreign 
exchange market (graph 1). Not only is there no space to increase the amount of base 
money through the purchase of government securities in these countries, but also 
there is almost none available to extend loans to banks although this function is 
distinctive for the central bank. This is because the central bank often has to buy more 
foreign currency then the amount of the necessary increase in base money. 
In the case of transition economies and newly founded states, the limitations and 
peculiarities are even more pronounced. The newly introduced money in a newly 
founded state cannot acquire credibility overnight. There is nothing national 
euphoria can do in this respect. In addition, the money, which is introduced, is de 
facto temporary – that is until the state adopts the Euro. This is why in these 
countries the use of parallel currency is inevitably tolerated, at least in the case of 
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some money functions or of some transactions. And this should not necessarily be 
regarded as something wrong or that they should try to prohibit it. It would be 
economically damaging trying to do so. At last, in the period of the “dinar” period 
not only were bank deposits denominated in German marks and other foreign 
currencies were allowed (“foreign currency deposits”)7, but also the German mark 
was the unofficial parallel money. It could not have been expected or it cannot be 
expected that with monetary sovereignty and the introduction of own money (kuna, 
tolar, denar, etc.) the country will be able to dismiss parallel money. In fact, in the 
case of such small monetary areas it is the best that the newly introduced money 
affirms itself in competition with the parallel one. In short, this means that the 
domestic money should become as good as the Euro, before the Euro’s adoption. 
Graph 2: Money in circulation (M1) as a share of the foreign currency denominated 













Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics and central banks
An additional peculiarity of the monetary arrangements of the newly founded states 
that we are discussing was that – at the time of their founding, their central banks 
had no or almost no international monetary reserves. This fact alone has determined 
with which exchange rate regime and hence, monetary arrangement, these countries 
will start. Thus, at the beginning an exchange rate regime in which the central bank 
7 These are deposits in foreign currency not foreign exchange deposits, as had been called and still are 
being called. In English they have been always correctly denoted as “foreign currency deposits”. But 
the misnomer “foreign exchange deposits” has prevailed in all countries. 
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had to sell foreign currency on the foreign exchange market was not an option. But 
in time, these countries have accumulated and increased their international 
monetary reserves – through surpluses in the current account of their balance of 
payments or primarily through foreign borrowing and economic assistance, and so 
were the possibilities for various monetary arrangements opened. 
In this sense already within the Yugoslavia after a certain period, Montenegro begun 
to gradually introduce the German mark and finally introduced it in November 
2000. In the beginning of 2002 the Euro replaced the German mark. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, for instance, introduced the currency board in August 1997. The value 
of the “konvertibilna marka” (MK) was set to 1 German mark, and at the beginning 
of 2002 it amounted to 0.511292 Euros. Other countries followed the “managed 
floating” regime, which is the most permissive as to its various varieties. From the 
de facto fixed exchange rate regime, in the case of Macedonia from 1997/98, to the 
regime of genuine managed floating that had Slovenia until June 28, 2004 when it 
joined the ERM 2. In that regime the value of the “tolar” depreciated almost daily 
against the Euro. As concerns other countries, namely Croatia and Serbia, Croatia 
opted for the regime very similar to the fixed exchange rate regime and Serbia, a 
regime where the value of “dinar” nominally depreciates frequently – but not with 
such frequency as it was in Slovenia. Although all these countries had at the 
beginning same monetary arrangement, they have decided to follow different 
monetary arrangements. 
Usually countries opt for a currency board when, due to economic, political or other 
reasons, they cannot come otherwise to the good money and hence cannot achieve 
monetary and financial stability. This is probably the case with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Montenegro opted for a radical solution – full dollarization (or better 
said euroization) although they would have been better off if they have opted for a 
currency board. Both regimes are similar in the sense that in both of them there is 
no space for independent monetary policy or exchange rate policy, with the 
difference that in the regime of a currency board the “seigniorage”, which is a 
monopoly profit from the issuance of money, remains in the hands of the state8. 
Neither of these two regimes guarantees absolute security or credibility to the 
citizens. They have not been introduced by foreign powers, but rather by the state 
itself. In addition, in both cases the currency and reserves that the banks hold at the 
central bank are not exposed to currency risk – in Montenegro this is because the 
currency is actually the Euro – but this does not apply to bank deposits or bank 
claims in general, what can been seen from Graph 2. So there is for instance in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina twice as much of narrow money (M1) as there are foreign 
exchange reserves the banks and the central bank have. 
8 The “seigniorage” can amount from 0,5 to 1% of GDP, and in certain circumstances – such as for 
instance in the case of great monetary expansion, even more. 
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Following the political, monetary and financial instability in 1996 and 1997, 
Macedonia succeeded to stabilize. Probably it was because the state decided that it 
didn’t want to incur great costs of stabilization again that the monetary policy has 
been chosen to act as a guarantee that it will not happen. The central bank has been 
targeting the stability of the Euro exchange rate on the foreign exchange market. 
Similarly occurred in Croatia where, after monetary and financial stabilization at 
the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, the Croatian “kuna” was introduced and 
has completely replaced the Croatian “dinar” by the end of the year. The Euro 
exchange rate has been used as a target of monetary policy, although not quite so 
strictly as in Macedonia. We can deduce it at least on the basis of the stability of 
Euro in both countries. 
Slovenia experienced the highest levels of inflation in October 1991 upon the 
introduction of its own currency, and then the inflation begun to lower gradually. In 
the whole period until June 28, 2004 inflation did not increase so there were no 
reasons to change monetary and the exchange rate policy. The low nominal 
depreciation of the “tolar” against the Euro was followed consistently – in a strict 
accordance with the managed floating regime. In the same period, Serbia 
experienced very high levels of inflation even hyperinflation, but even after the 
stabilization the fixed Euro exchange rate (or previously the German mark) wasn’t 
taken as a target of monetary policy. Namely, it is not advisable to opt for such a 
solution if there is a fair amount of certainty that it won’t be possible to be 
maintained such a regime (Mundell, 2001). We presume that in the case of Serbia, 
such certainty did not or could not exist. 
All considered, there is not one exchange rate regime that can be regarded as 
superior. There is only an exchange rate regime and a monetary arrangement that in 
given circumstances may be regarded as the best. Although the regimes we have 
mentioned in the cases above greatly vary, we cannot say that some of them were 
completely wrong. Circumstances in different countries varied as well. 
Nevertheless, we are interested in determining the appropriateness of a specific 
exchange rate regime and/or monetary arrangement; namely whether it was possible 
through the regimes to achieve adequate competitiveness of the economy and to 
prevent negative effects on the exchange rate that resulted from the sale of 
enterprises to foreign investors. It is generally known that the privatization of 
companies, especially their sale to foreigners, should improves the performances of 
privatized businesses. Privatisation cannot be considered as something negative. 
But we wish to analyse the impact that this process had on the exchange rate and 
consequently on the competitiveness of domestic businesses. 
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4. The sale of enterprises to foreigners and the central bank’s 
sterilization intervention on the foreign exchange market
From the aspect of fairness and from the point of economic effects on domestic 
saving and capital formation, when we wish to abolish social ownership of 
enterprises, it is irrelevant whether these enterprises are immediately sold to 
domestic investors or whether their shares are distributed among citizens who 
sooner or later sell them to domestic investors. Neither of these solutions can be 
regarded as fair or exempted from negative consequences on capital formation and 
saving. We can only gain a bit more fairness at the expense of domestic saving and 
capital formation. Vice versa, we can only gain with respect to national saving and 
capital formation at the expense of fairness (Ribnikar, 1997). 
Such problems are averted if enterprises being sold to foreigners. The great part of 
companies have been sold to foreigners anyway, although they did not know that by 
doing so they prevented negative effects on domestic saving and capital formation. 
Countries were namely selling these enterprises due to fiscal reasons, irrespective 
of the fact that these funds should not been used for financing current expenditure. 
But we are going to leave this aside. What we are interested in is the fact that with 
the sale of enterprises to foreigners another problem emerged. It emerged regardless 
of the fact whether such transactions were economically justified or not. This 
problem becomes visible on the foreign exchange market by decrease in the 
exchange rate and/or on the money market. The quantity of base money increases. 
By selling companies to foreigners foreign currency flows to the foreign exchange 
market and this is why the exchange rate decreases, if the central bank does not do 
anything about it. The central bank does not do anything about if there is pure 
floating exchange rate regime. But this was not the case in any of the countries 
mentioned above9. Central banks typically intervene on the foreign exchange 
market. A currency board, wrongly named the central bank in the case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, has to buy any amount of euros offered to at an unchanged, i. e. 
official rate. In this way the money base increases and so does the money supply. In 
the case of complete euroisation the money supply increases by the amount of 
money that comes for instance on the accounts of sellers of enterprises. In both 
cases there is a direct relation between transactions on the foreign exchange market 
and the money supply. This is actually theoretical model, but in our case it is a 
reality, which is usually denoted as the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments (Johnson, 1972 and Johnson, 1977). The connection with the world is 
complete and direct. But for Bosnia and Herzegovina and for Montenegro this is 
9 This is how central banks in very large monetary areas function, such as the FED or ECB. They do 
not intervene on the foreign exchange market. They affect the exchange rate indirectly – through 
changes in the interest rate. 
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not entirely true. In the first country we cannot consider its monetary arrangement 
to be a true “currency board”10, while the second country is not what we can call as 
a “true monetary area” (Mundell, 2001). Namely, the money supply in these 
countries can change regardless of the state of the balance of payments. This is why 
Graph 1, for instance, states that sterilization should have been impossible if in both 
countries we had the case of a “true monetary area” – the euro area. But as it is not 
the case, sterilization is possible but superfluous. Both countries were obliged to 
finance large current account deficits and so it would be unacceptable that their 
central banks create and hold foreign reserves created on the basis of sterilization 
purchases of foreign currency. 
In a managed floating regime the central bank can intervene in the foreign exchange 
market arbitrarily. It also has a large range of intervention, from of leaving of the 
exchange rate to almost freely fluctuate to preventing any changes in the exchange 
rate. The latter holds for Macedonia and Croatia, where the central banks have been 
targeting the unchanged Euro exchange rate. If the stability of the exchange rate is 
not the central banks’ target but some other thing, the central bank can allow some 
changes in the exchange rate and at the same time it can intervene on the foreign 
exchange market. In this case the connection with the world is not direct. The 
central bank can allow the exchange rate to fluctuate in the range it deems 
economically justified or appropriate. 
But it is not just that the central bank can direct the effects of the foreign money 
flowing on the foreign exchange market, to changes in the exchange rate or to the 
changes of the base money if it buys foreign currency. But it can buy foreign 
currency on the foreign exchange market either in sterilized or in unsterilized way 
and thus cause or does not cause changes in the base money base or not. If it buys 
in sterilised way, then there are no changes in the quantity of base or reserve money. 
In this way the central bank, if there is a managed floating exchange rate regime, 
acts as a “buffer” in the relations with the world or in this relation it determines 
independently what will be adjusted – whether the exchange rate or something else. 
It can be the quantity of base money, but it is not necessarily. If the central bank 
pursues the policy of a fixed exchange rate in a managed floating exchange rate 
regime, and this is the case in Macedonia and Croatia, then there are no adjustments 
through changes in the exchange rate. Something else has to change, and it is not 
necessarily the quantity of base money base. 
10 Originally the “currency board” issued, meaning that it exchanged for foreign currency (British 
pounds), only currency and not the other part of base money, it is bank reserves. There was no need 
for them, as there were no independent banks. For instance, in Mozambique banks were established 
as branches of London-based banks and so they were not obliged to hold reserves. Nowadays, the 
“currency board” exchanges foreign currency, Euros, for national currency of which part is 
transformed in bank reserves. And bank reserves are not “currency”, and therefore the name 
“currency board” is nowadays not quite appropriate. 
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And with this we have made an introduction to sterilization interventions, purchases 
and sales, made by central banks on the foreign exchange market and which are – 
as we will see – inevitable in a situation where privatization of enterprises is 
exercised through their sale to foreigners, and if the state wishes to eliminate the 
negative effects that the increase in the value of the national currency exerts on the 
competitiveness of companies. 
Sterilization interventions have been known since the gold standard, when the 
central banks wanted to prevent increases of the money supply on the basis of the 
inflow of gold. Their interventions have compensatory decreased the money supply 
through their sales of government securities or through decreases of the volume of 
rediscounts of bills of exchange. Thus, they sterilized the effects that the inflow of 
gold had on the money supply11. Moreover, we know also for the sterilization 
interventions of central banks on the foreign exchange market in the period 
following the World War II, when the fixed exchange rate regimes prevailed. This 
was an example of sterilization of the effect that the purchases of foreign currency 
by central banks exerted on the monetary base. But also in a floating exchange rate 
regime central banks are able to eliminate the undesired monetary effects of their 
purchases of foreign currencies by doing it in a sterilised way. 
But in all the cases we mentioned the intent was to either maintain the exchange 
rate at an officially determined level – in the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, 
or to eliminate high exchange rate volatility – in the case of a floating exchange rate 
regime. All of these central banks’ interventions on the foreign exchange market 
should not have had undesired monetary effects. Although in the case of transition 
countries that we discuss there are such reasons for sterilization interventions in the 
foreign exchange market, the main reason for such central bank intervention is 
another. 
The sale of enterprises to foreigners causes an increase in the supply of foreign 
currency in the foreign exchange market and pressures on the exchange rate to 
decrease. As this is a balance of payments item, that can be quantitatively very 
important for some short period of time, but not something that one can expect to 
be sustainable in the long run, it is probably not economically justified to let this 
item determine the level of the exchange rate. The increase in the value of the 
national currency decreases the competitiveness of domestic businesses; they are 
forced to leave foreign and domestic markets and thus there is more room for 
foreign businesses and imported goods. A deteriorated trade balance and the current 
account deficit are financed abroad – with money entering the country through the 
sale of enterprises to foreigners. But this cannot go on for a long time. When you 
11 This is because money stability – in the sense of its purchasing power, was of utmost importance. 
Everything was subject to this goal.
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sell everything that was possible to sell, then you cannot still face the same deficit 
in the current account of the balance of payments. As in the meantime many 
previous enterprises disappeared as uncompetitive, the adjustment to the quite new 
surrounding must be prolonged and painful. 
To avoid this happening, it is economically justified for the central bank to sterilize 
the amount of foreign currency that flows on the foreign currency market through 
the sale of enterprises, and in that way to prevent the appreciation of the domestic 
currency. This is a situation similar to one observed in countries which face large 
inflows of foreign currency due to oil exports, for instance, and which do not allow 
that inflow of foreign money to determine the level of the exchange rate. These 
foreign funds will namely sooner or later disappear. An excellent example of this is 
Norway and its “oil fund” where money coming from oil export is channelled and 
invested into shares and bonds of various companies around the world. In this way 
the oil export does not make damage to other industries; and beside the state has 
very large foreign currency reserves left aside for the time when the oil sources will 
be extinguished12. 
Picture 1: Exchange rate regimes and sterilisation
Exchange rate regimes
Pegged exchange rate to theeuro Managed floating regime
Sterilisation is impossible or
unnecessary














12 The Norwegian “oil fund” is just an example of numerous so called “sovereign wealth funds”, 
managed by countries that have large surpluses on the current account of their balance of payments. 
In this way these countries impede the appreciation of their own currency; they do not spend much 
– actually they live below their means, and actually they create reserves for times of duress.
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Whether a country follows a fixed exchange rate exchange rate policy in a managed 
floating exchange rate regime, or it follows a floating exchange rate regime, in both 
cases the central bank may through sterilization interventions on the foreign 
exchange market prevent that extraordinary events such as the inflow of foreign 
currencies from sales of enterprises to foreigners would push the exchange rate 
down and/or lead to the monetary expansion (Picture 1). But this is not true if the 
domestic currency is tightly pegged to the Euro, such as in systems with full 
euroisation (MNE) and currency board (BiH). If these systems really abide by their 
definition, then sterilization is not possible. However, in Montenegro and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina this is not the quite true, as we have already argued. These 
countries are not part of a “true monetary union”. This is why their monetary 
authorities may use sterilized purchases of foreign money, but such purchases have 
been neither necessary nor used. Namely, in these countries the deficit in the current 
account of the balance of payments is not created through capital imports, because 
of sale of enterprises for instance, rather capital is imported because of the deficit in 
the current account of the balance of payments.
Sterilization comes with a price. The cost to the central bank and at the same time 
to the state, equals the difference between the yield, which could be accrued from 
some other assets and the yield that the central bank gains for the increased 
international monetary reserves. Does sterilization increase interest rates or not, it is 
still unclear, and the answer depends in the first place on which interest rates one 
has in mind13.
Irrespective of the costs mentioned, international monetary reserves that are being 
increased via sterilization are often under attack. Politicians and their advisers often 
argue that these reserves should be spent for some useful purposes. If his happens 
the effects of central bank’s sterilization intervention on the foreign exchange 
market would be annihilated. If countries adhered to this principle and did not allow 
the inflow of capital resulting from the sale of enterprises to foreigners to affect the 
exchange rate, less domestic businesses were liquidated. The deficit of the current 
account of the balance of payments (Graph 3) mirrors the competitiveness of a 
country’s economy, it means that the business enterprises are not competitive. 
But foreign currency enters a country not only through the sale of enterprises, but 
also through foreign borrowing. Should these funds be sterilized through the 
intervention of central banks? If this would be the case, then countries would never 
make net imports and exports of capital, and this is something unusual. Foreign net 
13 There are many studies on the topic of sterilization (Frankel, 1994; Obstfeld, 1982; Rogoff, 1984) 
and opinions differ, especially regarding the fact how long can the central bank continue with such 
interventions. As for the interest rate, it would probably decrease if net imports of capital would be 
allowed, but it would also remain unchanged if this would not happen. And this is precisely the aim 
of sterilization. 
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borrowing or lending is something that one finds always. Besides, in contrast to the 
sale of enterprises that cannot go on for long and must sooner or later stop, 
borrowing is different. It can go on for a long time, and in addition it can create 
problems not only to the country, which borrows, but also to the lenders. Namely, it 
is the lenders who face credit risk and this is why borrowing and debt have their 
limits, although the Greece financial crisis and the crisis in several other countries 
show that those limits can often be crossed. Not only because of irresponsible 
borrowers, but also because of irresponsible lenders. The problem of Greece, 
Ireland and others, does not lie in their high public debt as can usually be heard, but 
in their overall foreign debt, which resulted from large and long-lasting deficits in 
the current account of the balance of payments14. 




















Note: The data for Serbia is shown on the right side axis
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
If we go back to sterilization, we can say that central banks can use sterilization 
purchases and sales of foreign currency as part of their foreign exchange policy, 
when they do not want to cause any monetary changes with their interventions on 
the foreign exchange market. In addition, they should purchase and thus sterilize 
14 The financial crisis in the Eurozone resulted from the fact that many countries lived well beyond 
their means, which is clearly mirrored in the deficits of their current accounts. This is also true for 
the countries we are discussing in this paper (Ribnikar and Bole, 2006). Graph 3 sketches these 
problems. Irrespective of this it is budgetary deficits that face major criticism today. This is probably 
because budget deficits can be fixed more easily; it is at least prevailing opinion, than to restructure 
the economy and make business enterprises competitive. 
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the money that flows into the country from the sale of existing enterprises to 
foreigners. But this should not be done in the case of the money that flows into the 
country on the basis of foreign borrowing. However, a problem remains; if the 
cross-border movement of capital and money is completely free the problem of 
short-term speculative capital may emerge. We discuss this in the next chapter. 
5. How to combine monetary and exchange rate policy
We have argued that it is economically justified, or even necessary, for the central 
bank to prevent negative effects that the inflow of foreign currency (due to the sale 
of enterprises to foreigners) may have on the exchange rate. If the central bank 
wouldn’t sterilize but rather buy this huge amount of foreign money in a straight 
way, control over the money supply would be gone. If it wouldn’t buy this money at 
all, then the domestic currency would appreciate. In addition we have in mind that 
such central bank interventions are not necessary in the case of foreign borrowing. 
Further, we must know that central bank’s interventions on the foreign exchange 
market are not instruments of monetary policy15, although in smaller countries this 
is the way in which the central bank issues or withdraws the majority of its money. 
Besides, we are not interested in the instruments of monetary policy and we simply 
take for granted that the central banks can control money supply by using their 
instruments of monetary policy. 
As interest rates in transition economies are generally very high, and not only 
because of the lack of savings or funds, but rather because of the lack of confidence 
in the domestic currency and banks, there may be some investors that find attractive 
to invest in short-term bank deposits or other short-term financial instruments. Such 
is the case with speculative or “hot” money, which lowers the exchange rate upon 
its entry and raises the exchange rate upon its exit from the country, unless the 
central bank manages to neutralize these effects. The amounts of such money can 
be very high and therefore it may happen that the central bank cannot buy all of this 
money through sterilization purchases. Although the decrease in the exchange rate 
upon the entry of speculative capital in the country could turn to be harmful to 
speculative investors themselves, and the same can be said for the rise in the 
exchange rate upon its exit16; namely such exchange rate volatility would seriously 
harm the economy. And it would be volatile, if the central banks do not intervene. 
15 We have to make a difference between how the quantity of the central bank money changes or how 
the central bank money is created, although there is no creativity to these process, and instruments of 
monetary policy. So for instance in the countries we talk about in this paper the major part of central 
bank money is not “created” through instruments of monetary policy. This is nothing extraordinary, 
besides that the so called structural position of the money market is running a large surplus. 
16 It is precisely because of this that developed countries and international monetary institutions, such 
as the IMF, have suggested to these countries to somehow fix their exchange rates. 
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In order to prevent this to happen and thus to exempt the central bank of costs 
associated with additional sterilization and the economy of the costs, which equal 
the additional earnings of foreign investors, the central bank must combine its 
monetary (level of interest rate) and foreign exchange policy (the expected rate of 
the exchange rate changes) in such a way that there are no interests of foreign 
investors to invest in short term bank deposits or other short-term financial 
instruments. The central bank can achieve this if it constantly monitors and keeps 
the so called uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP) (Ribnikar, 2003). As in transition 
countries the currency and sovereign risks were, and still are, much higher than in 
countries of the Euro area, it is not a matter of uncovered interest rate parity but 
rather of the uncovered interest rate imparity that is important. The difference or 
imparity should be equal to the sum premium for currency and country risk. 
If, for instance, the annual interest rate in the Euro area amounts to “x %” and the 
expected nominal appreciation of the Euro in a transition country amounts to 
“y %”, the annual interest rate in that transition country has to amount not only to 
“x % + y %” but it also has to take into account the annual premium for currency 
and country risk. The interest rate in foreign countries, in countries of the Euro area, 
is set. But the risk premium change, and usually lowers gradually, but usually not 
that much in the short-run. The central bank has to determine such a level of interest 
rate through monetary policy, that it will equal the sum of the interest rate in the 
euro area and the expected annual appreciation of the Euro. The latter is determined 
by exchange rate policy. But this is not enough. There has to be an adequate 
uncovered interest rate imparity and not parity. Adequate means that the sum of 
these interest rate or their percentages has to be higher than the interest rate in the 
Euro area for the amount of the premiums on currency and country risk. 
From these arguments stem a number of important facts. When cross border 
movements of capital are free, and this is something that all world countries have 
agreed upon, countries cannot conduct a completely independent monetary policy, 
and separately, an exchange rate policy. Here the type of exchange rate regime does 
not matter. But if countries did not “tie their hands” additionally through a fixed 
exchange rate regime or policy, they will at least have the opportunity to choose 
certain – but not deliberate or any – combinations of monetary and exchange rate 
policy. 
In this way there is a certain “trade-off”. Monetary policy can be changed toward 
more restrictiveness (the interest rate increases) if simultaneously as concerns the 
exchange rate the policy increases the level of the nominal appreciation of the Euro. 
If monetary policy changes toward more expansiveness ( the interest rate decreases) 
the exchange rate policy has to lower the level of the nominal appreciation of the 
Euro. Only in this way an adequate uncovered interest rate imparity against the 
Euro area will be maintained. In this sense the absolute level of the exchange rate is 
not important – what matters is its change in time; namely, the annual rate of 
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appreciation (or depreciation). And it is, of course, the expected changes and not 
realized changes. 
As regards the international movement of capital, an abrupt and/or unexpected 
change in exchange rates, or a relatively high depreciation of the national currency 
for instance, will not ceteris paribus affect capital flows – for instance short-term 
capital. But it will affect foreign trade. Besides, it will increase currency risk and 
country risk, which are both significant for domestic and foreign investors. For the 
purpose of our argument we leave aside the fact that an unexpected and high 
depreciation of the national currency is practically impossible. In all countries the 
level of euroization is very high, and the majority of bank deposits and loans is 
protected by a currency clause; in this way countries and their central banks are 
actually prisoners of this euroization. This is because when it comes to exchange 
rate policy their hands are tied. What is still available is the possibility of a gradual 
nominal depreciation of the national currency, which has to be coordinated with the 
monetary policy. 
All things considered then, in the case of transition countries the managed floating 
regime can be considered as better. A fixed exchange rate regime or managed 
floating regime with a fixed exchange rate policy precludes devaluation or the 
necessary depreciation of the national currency. And these options are necessary to 
all countries if they want to have equilibrium exchange rate. When due to different 
reasons a fixed exchange rate is inevitable, then everything else in the economy has 
to adjust to the fact that the domestic currency is de facto Euro. And if this is not an 
option, because it cannot be achieved, the performance of the economy will be 
permanently below its potential due to overvalued domestic currency. 
6. Conclusions
Research results based on the theoretical literature, historical facts, IMF data and 
the data of the central banks of the former Yugoslavia, confirmed the initial research 
hypothesis that monetary policy and exchange rate policies were not sufficiently 
applied in order to neutralize the negative effects on exchange rates, which were the 
result of the sale of enterprises to foreign investors. In all the countries discussed in 
this paper, a number of important issues for the introduction of a new economic 
system were being dealt with in a non-transparent way. However, it is not a mere 
problem of opacity, but rather what was being hidden. We primarily refer to the 
curious emergence of unusually wealthy individuals, owners of the companies. 
Who is the owner and the quality of the owner are of major significance for the 
efficiency of the economy. These owners have not demonstrated true ownership 
skills, but this is beyond the point we would like to make. Rather our intensions 
were to analyse the problems encountered by these countries at the beginning of 
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transition and how they should have be solving those problems, irrespective of the 
marvellous creation of new company owners, who were generally privatization-
predators, speculators, or nouveau riche. 
The first obstacles were encountered already with the abolishment of the social 
ownership of businesses. This should have been done only in the case of non-
financial enterprises. But privatization came as a priority, as if everything until then 
had been state-owned. Actually we know that this was not the case. In the process 
of the transformation of ownership there was an apparent dilemma whether to 
distribute the shares of companies in a fair way among citizens or whether to sell 
those companies at a market price, which was also seemingly fair. In both cases the 
outcome is the same. Namely, both are unfair and/or damaging solutions from the 
macroeconomic aspect – damaging in the sense that through these solutions 
domestic savings and formation of capital decreased. This did not happen when 
enterprises were sold to foreign investors – as new owners. This solution was also 
very popular, in addition to the already mentioned miraculous emergence of 
domestic wealthy owners. 
But with the sale of enterprises to foreign investors the significance of the 
appropriateness of the chosen monetary arrangement increases, as this arrangement 
should allow (although not all countries have used this opportunity) to the central 
bank to neutralize the negative effects that large foreign currency inflows could 
exert on the exchange rate. Through sterilization purchases of the foreign currency 
the central bank prevents the real appreciation of the domestic one. In this sense 
currency board, full euroization or the fixed exchange rate policy are not appropriate 
monetary arrangements. Besides its advantages (monetary stability) a fixed 
exchange rate has its own drawbacks – namely, it leads to the appreciation of the 
domestic currency. However, this policy was necessary in certain countries, and in 
this sense we must say that it was not wrong.
With full liberalization of cross-border movements of capital and money there is 
interconnection between monetary policy (the level of interest rate) and the 
exchange rate policy that has to be acknowledged. It has to be acknowledged if we 
wish to prevent speculative inflows and/or outflows of short-term capital. 
Sterilization prevents unjustified and damaging appreciations of the domestic 
currency, and the maintenance of an adequate uncovered interest rates imparity with 
respect to the Euro prevents damages that the speculative movement of capital can 
cause. 
Thus leaving aside all those things that were done in a non-transparent manner, if 
we adhere to this trendy term, we can conclude that neither the way in which social 
ownership was abolished nor monetary arrangements together with exchange rate 
regimes in the countries we have analysed were appropriate. They were not as they 
should have been. All of these countries got used to living beyond their means 
Ivan Ribnikar, Marko Košak • Transition, privatization and monetary arrangements... 
352 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2011 • vol. 29 • sv. 2 • 333-353
(Graph 3), but wages and living standards are nevertheless still rather low. This is 
probably due to other elements as well, not only those that were done in a non-
transparent way. In fact, despite the similarities, there are distinct differences among 
the states, and it is essential that the specificities of individual countries regarding 
exchange rate regimes and monetary arrangements are the subject of future 
research.
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Tranzicija, pretvorbe i monetarna uređenja u novonastalim državama na 
području nekadašnje Jugoslavije
Ivan Ribnikar1, Marko Košak2
Sažetak
Cilj našeg istraživanja je usporediti način pretvorbe društvenog vlasništva i 
monetarno uređenje u  zemljama nekadašnje Jugoslavije s načinom pretvorbe i 
monetarnim uređenjem koji bi bili optimalni. Metodom komparativne analize 
utvrđeno je da su način ukidanja društvenoga vlasništva poduzeća i monetarno 
uređenje odlučujuće određivali tranziciju u  tim zemljama. Rezultati istraživanja 
pokazali su da zbog načina privatizacije i monetarnih uređenja, koja su se de facto 
primjenjivala, nastala su gospodarstava s nekonkurentnim poduzećima. Pretvorba 
je bila makroekonomski za domaću štednju i formiranje kapitala, štetna i/ili za 
ljude nepravedna. Također, ustanovljeno je da se monetarno uređenje i politika 
deviznog tečaja uopće nisu koristili, ili su se koristili premalo za neutralizaciju 
negativnih posljedica prodaje poduzeća strancima. Slično vrijedi i za kombinaciju 
između monetarne politike i politike deviznog tečaja, da bi se sprječavao 
špekulativni uvoz i izvoz kratkoročnog kapitala. Za države, koje još nisu ušle u EU, 
vjerojatno bi bilo korisno  da u skladu  sa zaključcima naše rasprave preispitaju 
dosadašnji put prema tržišnoj ekonomiji.
Ključne riječi: monetarno uređenje, politika deviznog tečaja, tranzicija, države na 
području nekadašnje Jugoslavije
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